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NOTES ON LAWYERS AND COMMERCE
ANTHONY CHASE*

Reasons for business clients disliking or being suspicious of attorneys
are legion. First, some clients (including business clients) are disserved by
the lawyer they have retained. "Unfortunately," observes Richard Abel,
"most people view lawyers through their personal experience of the law,
which is usually unhappy (always for the losing party in litigation, often for
the winner too), and firmly believe lawyers produce injustice (clients want to
win, not lose to vindicate an ideal)." 1 Just as the victims of crime may look
upon the criminal defense attorney as the enemy (as much perhaps as the
alleged perpetrator himself), and adversaries in a divorce or child custody
proceeding may regard the lawyer for the other side with as much disdain, if
not more, than they hold for their soon-to-be former spouse, business clients
may see a competitor's lawyer as more of a problem than their opponent
who, while temporarily on the other side of a dispute, remains nevertheless
engaged in the same or similar trade.
"While business might find lawyers useful," remarks David Sugarman,
in an historical commentary on the British legal profession, "they also found
them expensive, technical, and time-consuming."2 As it was, these factors
often "turned litigation into a game of chess, which put a premium on tactics
and the wearing down of one's opponents [and u]sually only those with sufficient resources could take on a dedicated and well-financed adversary."3
Such observations immediately bring to mind the New Yorker magazine cartoon where a lawyer clasps his hands together and asks the client, sitting
across the desk from him, just how much justice he can afford.4 Business
clients gain no more pleasure than any anyone else from being compelled to
pay expensive, sometimes exorbitant, legal fees.
Even where business clients become convinced they are getting their
money's worth, they may still feel a sense of helplessness as a result of what
*Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and Legal Services, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
STUDEs 814 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
2. David Sugarman, Simple Images and Complex Realities: English Lawyers and Their
Relationship to Business and Politics, 1750-1950, in 2 LAW IN HISTORY: HISTORIES OF LAW
AND SOCIETY

145,168 (David Sugarman ed., 1996).

3. Id. at 169.
4. J.B. Handelsman, Cartoon, in
(1993).
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they perceive to be a dependent relationship with their attorney. "Not only
does the law factory serve the corporate system," wrote C. Wright Mills in
his book, White Collar, "but the lawyers of the factory infiltrate the system.
At the top, they sit on the Boards of Directors of banks and railroads, manufacturing concerns, and leading educational institutions. 5 Whatever the
commercial client's business strategy may be, it is the attorney who tells the
client what the law does and does not permit-it is the lawyer who seems to
call the shots. Describing the emergence of trade on a world scale, Kenneth
Pomeranz and Steven Topik record the following:
In most Southeast Asian ports, traders were organized into ethnic communities, each of which had a headman who was supposed to keep order. So
if, say, a Gujarati and a Dutch merchant fell out, their respective headmen
would first meet to settle the dispute. This had its own perils for the merchants-they often lost the chance to speak for themselves, and might find
their own case sacrificed to the broader 6interests of their communities, or
the political ambitions of their headman.
While C. Wright Mills acknowledges the Wall Street law firm's interest
in national politics "is usually only a means of realizing its clients' economic
interests,"7 one still wonders how many corporate clients must nevertheless
have felt that their subservience to their respective headmen was not all that
different from the Dutch merchants who first penetrated the Southeast Asian
market.
The commercial client's anxiety over the power of attomeys and expenses added on to the normal costs of doing business incurred when lawyers
become involved is of ancient vintage. As we shall see, it was already present and given voice in the ancient world-specifically, the world of Greek
maritime traders. This essay briefly examines the attitudes and commentary
upon lawyers and the law's delay, characteristic of classical Greece and medieval Spain, before turning to a brief assessment of similar complaints expressed in the New World, that of colonial America. The latter represents an
instructive example of law and lawyers in a commercial setting where the
familiar adage that the more things change, the more they stay same, turns
out not to apply. In The Ancient Economy, M.I. Finley states that whatever
the precise definition of the term class society,

5.

C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR 126 (1951).
KENNETH POMERANZ & STEVEN TOPIK, THE WORLD THAT TRADE CREATED: SOCIETY,
CULTURE, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1400 - THE PRESENT 31 (1999).
7. MILLS, supra note 5, at 126.

6.
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[Flor the ancient historian there is an obvious difficulty: the slave and the
free wage labourer would then be members of the same class, on a mechanical interpretation, as would the richest senator and the non-working
owner of a small pottery. That does not seem a very sensible way to analyse ancient society. 8

While G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, in his landmark book, The Class Struggle
in the Ancient Greek World, clearly disagrees with Finley on the applicability
of this category to the analysis of ancient society,9 both historians readily
agree that if the world of the Greek maritime traders was a full-blown commercial society, it was not a capitalist one.1" On the contrary, the emergence
of capitalism in Western Europe was still two thousand years away.
"Litigants who faced Athenian juries did so with minimal professional
help," observes Steven Johnstone, and "[t]here were no legal experts, no
lawyers, in Athens."'" But if ancient Athens was without a legal profession,
it was not without litigation. Not only was Athenian law procedurally complex 12 but "even without specialized personnel, Athenian litigation gave rise
to insular traditions of legal practice." 3 For Johnstone, these "practices of
litigation mark the autonomy of courts."' 4 The autonomy of Greek courts,
the insular traditions of legal practice, and the procedural complexity of
Greek law all contributed to growing problems of delay in Greek justice. An
important exception to one side, according to Edward Cohen, "[t]he Athenian courts otherwise were subject to long delays."' 5 Cohen cites one case
which "came to trial some seven years after initiation of the prosecution" and
adds that "[w]hile the statutory time limitation ...

appears normally to have

been five years" another case did not come to court until "fourteen years
after the relevant agreement had been made. ' 6
What was that single exception to the typical delay litigants suffered in
Athenian courts? It was the separate system of maritime law and adjudication. "Thus Athenian commercial maritime law," says Cohen, "was in accord with various modem systems that in practice offer procedural time-

8. M.I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 49 (updated ed., 1999) (1973).
9. G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD FROM
THE ARCHAIC AGE TO THE ARAB CONQUESTS 58 (1981).
10. Comparegenerally FINLEY, supra note 8 with DE STE. CROIX, supra note 9.
11. STEVEN JOHNSTONE, DISPUTES AND DEMOCRACY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LITIGATION
IN ANCIENT ATHENS 18 (1999).

12.
13.
14.

See id. at 130.
Id. at44.
Id.

15.

EDWARD E. COHEN, ANCIENT ATHENIAN MARITIME COURTS 10 (1973).

16.

Id.
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preference for certain commercial actions."' 7 It is this commercial fast-track
which Cohen takes as the primary subject of his research and he argues that
"[t]he peculiar procedural characteristics of empiric cases developed in a
legal system that had attained considerable sophistication in its commercial
maritime regulations."' 8 Cohen discusses the remarkable supranationality of
Greek maritime courts, their openness to traders of all nationalities, and concludes that "[w]ith commerce so vital to Athens, with the state interest in
trade accordingly high, the autonomy of commercial procedure at Athens is
understandable."' 9 At least it is understandable that in a commercial society,
commerce may be valued sufficiently that a relatively autonomous system of
commercial litigation might be created for the purpose of avoiding many of
those typical complaints business clients routinely lodge against lawyers and
the legal system.
Cohen points out that it was not only the maritime courts of Athens, in
the fourth century B.C., which were open to traders from all throughout the
maritime world.2" At both Syracuse and Rhodes, "nationals of foreign states
could also litigate freely in the local commercial courts"'" and it was at Rhodes that both substance and procedure adopted by the Greek maritime courts
began to be codified.2 2 "The Rhodian Code," according to A. Pearce Higgins
and C. John Colombos, "which dates from the third or second century B.C.,
was evidently of great authority in the Mediterranean for its principles were
accepted by both Greeks and Romans and its memory lasted for a thousand
years. '23 The Rhodian Code helped to shape maritime law up through the
French Laws of Oleron and the British Black Book of the Admiralty.24 "All
of these attempts at codification," asserts Stanley Jados, "are best exemplified by the codification, publication, and general acceptance in the fifteenth
century of the Consulate of the Sea. Azuni referred to the Consulate, as a
25
document 'whose authority is above all others.'

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 69.
COHEN, supra note 15, at 70.
Id. at 69.

22.

See generally A. PEARCE HIGGINS & C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

THE SEA 24 (1943) (stating the Romans adopted the Sea Laws of the Rhodians).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 24-28.
25. STANLEY S. JADOs, Preface to the CONSULATE OF THE SEA AND RELATED
at xiii (1975).
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Edgar Gold, who also refers to the Consulate as the "law of Barcelona, ' ' records that the first version of this codification was written in the
Catalan language about 1300 and became "immensely popular ' 27 because it
managed to appear "at the right time-the time of the expansion of truly international trade and commerce., 28 In the main English language monograph
on the Consulate of the Sea (or Consulado del Mar), Robert Sydney Smith's
The Spanish Guild Merchant, the author observes:
Innumerable records furnish evidence that a fundamental motive of the
Spanish Consulado was to secure the expeditious, economical, and equitable adjudication of disputes concerning maritime and mercantile contracts.
An early privilege (1325) granted to the councilors of Majorca reveals
their determination to circumvent the legalism and obstructions encountered in the ordinary courts through the institution of the Consulado (citation omitted). The sea consulate of Barcelona was established "in order to
proceeddo away with the expenses of lawsuits and the strife of judicial
29
ings among merchants and navigators" (citation omitted).

Here Smith tills the very same soil as the historians discussed above in
mapping various pitfalls that await the business litigant in conventional
courts and routine legal process. Just as Sugarman's British commercial
interests often found recourse to lawyers expensive, technical, and timeconsuming, and just as Cohen's ordinary Athenian courts were subject to
long delays, the Consuladodel Mar provided maritime traders with an attractive alternative to the legalism and obstruction encountered in medieval Barcelona's regular courts.3" Smith continues:
Pointing to the procedure of the consular court in Perpignan as a model for
the sea-consuls of Montpellier, the king declared that the trammels of ordinary justices had reduced many merchants to poverty (citation omitted).

Pleading for consular privileges, the merchants of Burgos represented that
in ordinary courts mercantile cases were "never terminated," because 3law1
yers found ways to prolong litigation, no matter how unjust the claim.

26.

EDGAR GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT:

THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MARINE

POLICY AND SHIPPING LAW 27 (1981).

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ROBERT SYDNEY SMITH, THE SPANISH GUILD MERCHANT:
CONSULADO, 1250-1700, at 6 (Octagon Books 1972) (1940).

A HISTORY OF THE

30. Id.
31.

Id. at 6-7.
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Thus, Spanish mercantile traders seeking enforcement or interpretation
of maritime contracts, were presented with the same kind of commercial fasttrack or procedural time-preference, as Cohen put it, as were early Greek
traders.32 And just as the Athenian maritime courts had pioneered a very
forward-looking supranational jurisdiction, treating litigants equally regardless of nationality, the Consuladodel Mar provided a direct response to those
medieval merchants, described by Smith, who railed against the "inability of
foreign traders to secure fair treatment at moderate cost in the ordinary courts
of [Marseilles]." 33 So it can be said that when confronted with a contradiction between the "inherent nature of commerce, 34 the equally inherent nature of law, and the almost inescapable expense and technical complexity
encountered in seemingly endless legal process, a range of societies sufficiently sympathetic to the business client's woes (and the stake of society as
a whole, after all, in an expeditious as well as efficient public support for
commerce) simply created an alternative social process to that of traditional
litigation for the handling of mercantile disputes.
It was just these elements of flexibility and attention to the existing
practices of maritime traders which declined when Spain's role as a dominant force in international trade and commerce itself began to decline.35
Eventually, as John Lynch argues, the Spanish government in 1690
appointed a junta to advise on the promotion of American trade, and subsequently asked [Manuel de] Lira to comment on its report, which simply
recommended rigid prohibition of trade with foreigners. Lira reacted
sharply against the growing xenophobia ....He argued that it was precisely the ban on trade with foreigners that induced the English, the Dutch
and the French to establish settlements in the Indies.... In addition to reviving and expanding American trade, which in turn would stimulate
Spanish manufactures and merchant marine, Lira believed that his proposals would convert England and the United Provinces into firm allies, for
36
they would have a stake in a vital sector of the Spanish economy ....

Sadly for Spain, as Lynch points out, Manuel de Lira was pessimistic
about the chance of his proposals being adopted and "in fact they were not.
Many of them would have simply legalised existing practice, and the government could not bring itself to do this., 37 Thus the very things that had
32.

COHEN, supranote 15, at 10.
33. SMITH, supra note 29, at 6 (citation omitted).
34. COHEN, supra note 15, at 63.
35. See generally 2 JOHN LYNCH, SPAN UNDER THE HABSBURGS:
1598-1700 (1969).

SPAN AND AMERICA

36. Id. at 279.
37. Id.
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removed the law's delay and the trammels of conventional litigation from the
commercial arena-that had lifted these legal burdens from the merchant's
shoulders-lost favor, and precisely in that part of the world where the Consulado del Mar had been born and proved so effective. It was the existing
practice of merchants, not lawyers and government bureaucrats, on which the
international system of commerce had seemed to thrive. And it was the "establishment of an exceptional commercial jurisdiction, '3 8 in ancient Greece
as well as medieval Spain, which had given rise to such successful (and unobtrusive or counterproductive) commercial regulation. But the wheel of
power and prestige in the world of global trade was simply making another
turn-this time in the direction of the New World.
If maritime traders in the sixteenth century complained of the plethora
of suits among merchants trading with America, and government policy two
centuries later failed to recognize the link between an open system, comercio
libre, and American trade and development, the colonists who had settled in
the sometimes bitter environment across the Atlantic were themselves initially hostile to the kind of entrepreneurial values which animated economic
and helped relationships of commercial exchange to multiply raptraders
9
idly.

3

The story about how the early resistance of New England's European
settler communities gradually gave way, by the end of the eighteenth century, to an emerging agrarian capitalist society is by now not only familiar
but the most widely accepted description of just what happened within the
New World economy during this period. Equally credited by historians is
the once-controversial narrative of how lawyers and courts reshaped early
American common law and institutions to serve the dominant interests of
commercial enterprise: "Real values pushed aside by exchange values, declining employment of equitable remedies, and the rise of caveat emptor,
judges subordinating common law to the market-these were the hallmarks
of an entrepreneurial revolution which took the nineteenth-century legal system by storm." 40

On the event of this transformation, however, the most conventional
sort of diatribe was directed at attorneys by the merchant class and Republican pamphleteers. Charles Warren, in A History of the American Bar, records that "the most powerful attacks on the 'dangerous' and 'pernicious'
'order' of lawyers and their 'malpractices, delays and extravagant fees' were
the letters of Benjamin Austin, an able pamphleteer and Anti-Federalist poli38.

SMITH, supranote 29, at 7.

39. Id. at 73-76.
40.

Id. at 111.
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tician of Boston, who wrote, in 1786, under the name of 'Honestus,' and
whose letters had a widespread influence."'" While less familiar and harder
to find, Austin's essays and broadsides, published in The Independent
Chronicle under the name "Old-South," pack such a punch and contain such
a fine vitriolic wit that they remain worth reading.42 In his discussion of the
judiciary, for example, Austin asks, "is there a man in the United States who
wishes to extend this department of our government? Where is the man who
candidly thinks that the bench and the bar, (though respectable as men) have
not already their full preponderancy of weight in the community? ' 43 After a
stinging attack on Theophilus Parsons, Esq., for not appearing in court
promptly at ten o'clock in the morning on a day when an argument by him
had been scheduled, Austin extended his frustration to the whole of the profession, "[a] particular body of men, [who] of late have placed themselves in
an attitude which appears calculated to stop the wheels of government. They
assume an arrogance of deportment to which no free government ought to
submit."
One way of looking at the American case is simply to argue that, as in
antiquity and medieval Spain (up to a point), experience eventually taught
the professions of law and commerce, as well as those who managed the
judicial and legislative apparatus, that the substance and procedure of law
needed to be streamlined if business was to be carried on efficiently and
profitably.
But such an argument would actually miss the pointoverlooking the most important aspect of New World law and economy.
While an independent body of maritime law was preserved and developed in
early America, it was not simply the legal universe of merchants and traders
that was redesigned to serve specific economic goals. The entire legal and
political system, in fact, was refashioned in order to serve not just businessmen but capitalism itself as a mode of production.
Even after the 'great transformation' of American law in the years prior
to the Civil War, such a revolutionary project would not and could not eliminate all the concerns and frustrations of the merchant class in any particular
division or sector of the economy. That was not its purpose. As Ellen Meiksins Wood puts it:

41.

CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 219 (1990).
BENJAMIN AUSTIN, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, IN OPPOSITION TO
FALLACIOUS FEDERALISM; AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE,

42.

UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF OLD-SOUTH (1803).

43.
44.

Id.at 251.
Id. at 297.
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The economic imperatives of capitalism are always in need of support by
extra-economic powers of regulation and coercion, to create and sustain
the conditions of accumulation and maintain the system of capitalist property. The transfer of certain 'political' powers to capital can never eliminate the need to retain others in a formally separate political 'sphere'....
To stabilize its constitutive social relations-between capital and labour or
capital and other capitals--capitalism is especially reliant on legally defined and politically authorized regularities. Business transactions at
every level require consistency and reliable enforcement,
in contractual
45
relations, monetary standards, exchanges of property.

Consequently, contemporary conflicts between the economic interests
of different professions (law, medicine) or industries (health care, insurance)
or social groups (consumer advocates, tort reform) may at times produce
both animosity and sharp opposition. These conflicts may be mitigated, resolved, heightened, or exploited by politicians and the mass media. A corporation, downsizing, may decide to bring its legal representation in house in
order to save money on legal expenses. Government may impose labor or
ecological regulations on private industry which cut into profits or encourage
relocation abroad. IRS lawyers may try to prove in court that a company has
not paid its fair share of taxes, and so on. But none of that means that lawyers---or the legal system-are fundamentally hostile to business. On the
contrary, within capitalism alone do businessmen and women find themselves operating in a legal environment where the entire system has been
designed to serve the main aims of capital. In what alternative economy
would the fortunes of business share a brighter prospect?

45. ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM: A LONGER VIEW 178-79 (Verso
2002) (1999).
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